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No. 1920

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ROMANIAN HISTORY REVIEW TAKES ISSUE WITH BULGARIAN HISTORIAN

[Editorial Report] An article by Petre Diaconu entitled: "Political Realities in the Lower Danube: Romanians, Byzantines, Bulgarians and Petchenegs," published in the Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE, monthly organ of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, Section for History and Archeology, June 1981, pages 1111-1133, discusses the following work by Bulgarian historian I. Bozhilov: "The Anonymous One of Hase. Bulgaria and Byzantium in the Lower Danube at the End of the 10th Century," published by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Sofia in 1979.

The following is a translation of excerpts from REVISTA DE ISTORIE's French resume of Diaconu's article:

While recognizing the merits of I. Bozhilov who rejects the thesis that the notes of the anonymous one were a falsification committed by Ch. B. Hase [a 19th century French Byzantologist who edited the notes], the author of the present study rejects the interpretations of the Bulgarian historian in this regard.

For example, I. Bozhilov believes that the Notes contain information regarding the presence of a Bulgarian population and of Bulgarian rule in Moldavia and Wallachia at the end of the 10th century. The thesis brings in some archeological "arguments." A close analysis of the text of these Notes authorizes us to state that, at the time, the regions mentioned were inhabited by Romanians, just as Dobrudja was, at that time and that the barbarians who attacked the region ruled by the Anonymous One, probably located somewhere in Dobrudja, were Bulgarians. The proper interpretation of the information contained in the Notes gives us no information that "the leader north of the Danube" was the Bulgarian tsar Samuel, as I. Bozhilov believes. Instead, he was a Petcheneg chief since it was the time that the Petchenegs were taking political control of the lands north of the mouth of the Danube.

The author also points out the baselessness of the arguments invoked by I. Bozhilov to prove a Bulgarian presence in the Lower Danube dating from the 5th century or to show that the dukedoms of Transylvania, such as the one headed by Menemrut, constituted a proof of the domination of the Bulgarian state in this region of our country in the 10th century.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

ARMED FORCES POLITICAL HEAD ON MILITARY MISSION, TRADITIONS

East Berlin TRIBUENE in German 8 May 81 p 5

[Holgar Arnold interview with Col Gen Heinz Kessler, deputy national defense minister and chief, political administration of the National People's Army (NVA): "The Protection of Peace Has Been Written Into Our Army's Genealogical Record, Or, What the NVA Soldiers Regard as Their Most Important Mission"]

[Text] Heinz Kessler was born in 1920 as the son of a class-conscious working class family in Laubau. In 1929 he joined the Red Young Pioneers in Chemnitz (which is today Karl-Marx-Stadt). From 1934 to 1937 he was trained as a machinist. He worked in this occupation until 1940. In 1940 Heinz Kessler was drafted into the fascist Wehrmacht. In keeping with his upbringing, he fought against fascism and only a few days after the beginning of fascist aggression against the Soviet Union, he joined the Red Army.

Heinz Kessler was one of the founders of the "Free Germany National Committee," which was formed by German communists, anti-fascists and prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. He took part in the Soviet Union's struggle against the fascist German imperialism.

After the liberation of the German people from fascism through the Soviet army and its allied forces in 1945, Heinz Kessler led the first anti-fascist youth committee of Berlin. After the founding of the Free German Youth, he became chairman of the FDJ leadership for Berlin and--even as far as taking over missions in the armed branches--secretary of the central council. After that Heinz Kessler earned merits in his service for the protection of the accomplishments of the first socialist state on German soil.

At first he was chief of the People's Police Air and held the rank of inspector general. After attending an academy in the Soviet Union, he was named chief of the air force/air defense in 1956. From 1967 to 1978, Col Gen Heinz Kessler was deputy national defense minister and chief of NVA headquarters. In

the beginning of January, 1979, he took over the functions of deputy national defense minister and chief, political administration of the NVA.

Since 1946 Heinz Kessler has been a member of the party leadership, i.e. of the SED Central Committee. In 1950 he was elected to the People's Chamber and has been its delegate since then. Heinz Kessler has been honored with high national and social awards of the GDR as well as of the Soviet Union and other socialist nations. He has received the Karl-Marx medal, the medal of the October Revolution, the Patriotic Merit Badge and the Scharnhorst medal.

[Question] Comrade Col Gen, what was written into the NVA's genealogical record 25 years ago, when the NVA was founded?

[Answer] The NVA was formed in a country in which the workers, under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary avant garde, had already been in power for seven years. They had created their socialist state, which now began to organize for its protection against enemies from outside by forming a standing army. The army to be established could not receive any mission other than the mission of victorious workers and farmers who must defend the revolutionary achievements of the people. It was this which was--as you put it--written into the genealogical record.

This basic concern of our army is reflected--was reflected even while it was being founded--in the political composition of its officer corps. Of the 26 leading generals and admirals, 18 had belonged to the workers' movement before 1933. Seventeen had participated in the anti-fascist resistance struggle, nine of them in Spain, and five in the "Free Germany" movement, eight had been imprisoned by the fascists in concentration camps and penitentiaries. More than 85 percent of all officers were SED members or candidates in 1956.

[Question] The NVA did not stand alone...

[Answer] Of course not. When solving military problems, we could depend on the Soviet army's vast experience, the knowledge of Soviet military science, and the constant, immediate practical help of Soviet comrades, who were at that time advisors to the NVA. The GDR armed forces were formed and developed from the very start with its role and mission in the international Socialist military coalition, which had come into existence with the Warsaw Pact, in mind. The brotherhood-in-arms relations, which grew out of this, were and still are important, not only for quickly achieving military mastery. Above all, they are a source of military and moral strength. They let members of the NVA experience the strength of our alliance, the reliability and loyalty of the brothers-in-arms, as was the case, e.g., during the "Brotherhood-in-Arms 80" maneuvers of the "Sojus 81" commando staff exercises.

[Question] The peace mission of the Socialist armed forces has been proven many times through history. Can you name a few examples of this?

[Answer] If we had been successful for more than 35 years in containing the aggressive imperialist forces militarily, and in maintaining peace in our continent, then we must primarily thank the socialist community and its military power. The USSR and its armed forces carried the main burden. The combat strength and combat readiness of the allied socialist armies has a sobering effect on the imperialist aggressors. We have experienced how, e.g., in 1961 the firm attitude of the Soviet Union and of the other fraternal nations of our alliance prevented a threatening imperialist aggression in the heart of Europe and supported GDR security measures on 13 August. Let's remember the prevention of war in 1962. The USSR and the other Warsaw Pact nations at that time forced the United States with appropriate military measures to renounce the use of military force against Cuba. In 1968 also, the NATO powers were not successful in breaking Czechoslovakia out of the Socialist community, because the Soviet army, the NVA and other fraternal armies defended the interests of that country as if they were their own. All this makes it clear that the Socialist armed forces represent a significant weight on the scale of peace.

[Question] Traditions also say much about the essence of our army...

[Answer] That is completely right. The NVA conserves and continues the progressive military traditions of German history, of the history of the international workers' movement and of the brotherhood-in-arms in the military coalition. The highest military award of the GDR, e.g., bears the name of von Scharnhorst. Regiments, barracks, ships and boats are named after heroes of the anti-fascist resistance struggle and of the Great Patriotic War, of the revolutions of 1848 and 1918, or after true patriots who fought against Napoleonic oppression.

[Question] What do you think of the so-called eternal soldier's virtues, such as courage, bravery, aggressiveness, and a sense of comradeship?

[Answer] "Eternal" military virtues are a demagogical invention of the bourgeois military. With this they want to cover up the crimes which were committed by their exploitative armies, which even include genocide. In this way, fascist war criminals are considered acceptable in the Bundeswehr, i.e. progressive traditions are being misused. The Bundeswehr soldier is being manipulated with "eternal" models. It by no means concerns courage and bravery "in themselves," but rather the question "what for, and against what?" The virtues of the soldier of a socialist army therefore show in his conscious dedicated to socialism, for the protection of the achievements of the working people.

[Question] The NVA has not had to prove itself the way the Soviet army had to. How does the NVA soldier measure how he fulfills his military duties?

[Answer] So far we have been successful in preventing a war in Europe. The NVA soldiers have played their part in this during the past quarter of a century. At the same time we must not overlook the fact that members of our armed forces must prove themselves even today. I am thinking of the deployment force of the air force/air defense at sea. These are missions which must be fulfilled to secure our air space and our sea borders in the Baltic against forces of the GDR and other NATO armies.

The joint maneuvers of the united Warsaw Pact forces represent difficult tests of conscious acts of political and military responsibility. Combat worthiness is accounted for in these maneuvers. And finally, the soldier must prove himself every day--in combat training, during guard duty, in his mastery of combat technology, during training for combat readiness, in the field as well as in the classroom. The measures of his achievement are the party's decisions, the orders and demands of his superiors for the fulfillment of the training programs and norms in combat training, as they are laid down in the appropriate regulations.

[Question] How can the soldier of a socialist army prove courage and bravery in peacetime?

[Answer] Many members of the Free German Trade Union Federation, who have served in our army, could answer this question from their own experience. The soldier is trained in courage and bravery during combat training in all branches of service, so that he can survive in armed combat, when it is a matter of life or death. I am thinking, e.g., of the motorized infantrymen, when they have to overcome phosphorus fires or have a tank roll over them. Or take the maneuver formation flying of the fighter bombers, or naval missions in rough seas. In addition there are exceptional cases, as the saving of human lives and technology during salvage and catastrophe missions.

[Question] In which characteristics and skills does the NVA officer of the 1980's excel?

[Answer] The profession of an officer is a vocation in the truest sense of the word. Whoever follows it needs solid class consciousness, party loyalty, a firm internationalistic attitude and extensive military knowledge and skills. In view of the coming years, two things seem to me to be especially important in this connection. First of all, it is the urge and the ability of the officer to react quickly to everything new. Our armed forces are developing rapidly. New realizations must be adapted to constantly, because processes are under way which affect all aspects of military life. The officer of the 1980's must therefore be a very creative person, who helps direct and further these processes.

Secondly, I would like to emphasize the officer's ability to inspire his men to enthusiasm for the missions to be solved, to stimulate them, to sweep them along and to lead them to do their very best. Socialist troop leadership is above all leadership of men. This fact is decisive for the NVA officer, whether he is a commander, staff officer, political officer or specialist.

[Question] During the past year, the international situation has obviously become more critical. How, Comrade Col Gen, do you judge this situation?

[Answer] The communist party of the Soviet Union, the SED and also other fraternal parties have unanimously evaluated the international situation during their latest party congresses. Imperialism has begun a counter offensive in order to escape the historical defensive position. Aggressive forces of the monopoly capital world obviously believe that they have found the way in superior military strength with which the advance of socialism, its growing international influence and also the national liberation movements can be stopped, i.e. destroyed.

For that reason, they start insane arms programs, such as NATO's long-term program, the United States' intensive arms program, the stationing of American medium-range missiles in NATO countries of Western Europe. The emphasis lies on, among other things, the introduction of new strategic offensive weapons--the MX inter-continental ballistic missile equipped with multiple warheads and a new long-range bomber and the building of additional war ships. The forming of the so-called American intervention force is accelerated. This is a machinery of aggression designated for development in the Near East and East. The United States tries to force their NATO partners with massive pressure to introduce the neutron bomb into the arsenal of means of mass destruction.

Important to the imperialists is the military superiority over socialism as a basis for unrestrained and brutal power politics which calculates on war. This makes the struggle for peace, based on the suggestions submitted by the Sixteenth Party Congress to the communist party of the Soviet Union even more urgent.

[Question] How is it that voices appear in the FRG which cry loudly along with the others for more and more, and more modern weapons?

[Answer] German imperialism, as a consequence of the combination of historical, political and economic factors, has always been especially aggressive and rapacious. After its striking defeat in World War II, it was able, on part of the territory of the former German empire, not only to restore itself with the help of the victorious Western powers, especially of the United States, but finally to become the first among the capitalist nations in Europe. Those in political, economic and military power use the FRG's monopoly bourgeoisie in order to check history, to reestablish their rule within 1937 borders. The most aggressive among them openly count on military force, on the course of war of the United States and of NATO.

[Question] For that reason, the overwhelming majority of our Republic's young men understand the necessity for socialist armed forces and fulfills its obligation with a sense of responsibility. But here and there are some who--especially when it concerns extended duty--shrink from the harshness of military service. What do you say to that?

[Answer] You are asking two questions. The harshness of military service is undisputed. But tens of thousands of draftees prove year after year that the better one is prepared for them--especially in the Society for Sport and Technology, but also in the Free German Youth, and in labor union collectives--the better one can meet the psychological and physical demands of active service.

As far as extended service is concerned, we see this also as a question of preparation. It concerns an understanding of the necessity, a deeper understanding of the importance of socialist national defense, and especially the armed forces. Union collectives can and must contribute to this also out of a sense of responsibility. We know that this is done successfully in many places, but also that more could be done.

[Question] A few weeks ago the Tenth SED Party Congress took place. Delegates of military party organizations took part also. What results were they, as NVA representatives, able to report?

[Answer] In summary, it is the fulfilled military class mission given to our armed forces by the Ninth Party Congress. Hidden behind this brief statement are great achievements by members of the armed forces in combat training and the struggle for growing combat readiness of companies, regiments and divisions of all branches of service. The NVA was judged by the Tenth SED Party Congress to be a modern, combat worthy socialist coalition army, which has always justified the trust of the party of the working class and of the entire nation. This high estimation obligates us to make our contribution to the reliable protection of socialism and of peace in the future also, and to always be combat-ready in the socialist military coalition.

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CSO: 2300/304

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

TACTICAL ASSAULT HELICOPTER EXERCISE DESCRIBED

East Berlin FLIEGER-REVUE in German No 7, Jul 81 pp 305-307

[Article by Lt Col Kuno Baaske, Air Forces/Air Defense Command (LSK/LV), member, FLIEGER-REVUE editorial board: 'National People's Army (NVA): To the Other Bank']

[Text] Accomplishments in the military safeguarding of peace by members of the NVA were part of the successes reported at the Tenth SED Party Congress. Every day they struggle for greater combat strength and combat readiness and thus fulfill the promise given by General Heinz Hoffmann at the party congress, that our party, our people and our allies will always be able to rely on them.

Our author, Lt Col Kuno Baaske, witnessed one exercise where one NVA helicopter unit mastered a difficult task.

Thick clouds are hanging over the airport. Lt Col Paul Liefeld, wing commander, looks up to the sky and says: "Difficult weather, and visibility is not going to improve." A shrugging of shoulders. It probably means that there is nothing one can do about the weather. After the last airborne soldier has taken a seat in the cockpit of the Mi-8 helicopter, the door is shut. A few minutes before the planned take-off, the engines roar. The powerful lifter propeller begins to turn. The helicopter trembles slightly, rocking on its shock absorbers. We roll over the lawn to the starting point. First our chain, then the entire wing.

At precisely the right second the machine vibrates under full engine power. We lift off and climb 2 or 3 meters. We stay in place. A slight vibration. Now the cockpit tilts forward, and finally the Mi-8 thunders across the field with full force. The machines to the right and to the left, as I observed immediately, follow exactly. Now the unit builds a formation in the air. Lt Col Liefeld is flying with an experienced crew: the second helicopter pilot, 1st Lt Gerald Boenig, has proven himself several times, also 1st Sgt Herbert Georgi, the flight technician. They have practical experience with combat technology as well as good theoretical knowledge. But in spite of this, today's combat mission is difficult. In spite of the unexpectedly bad weather, the ground forces must be supported while crossing the river by air attacks on enemy positions on the other bank and airborne troops must be put down. This is the combat mission to which they must be totally dedicated. We are not flying at too great an altitude, perhaps 200 m.

Above us loom almost threateningly dense clouds, parts of them seeming to reach for us from time to time. Visibility? Possibly 2 km. Commander Liefeld looks briefly to the "No. 2," who is just putting a finger on the map and calling out the name of a town.

General Boenig is a master of navigation. He is a first class helicopter pilot and is used to flying complicated exercises. With concentration he observes the terrain, repeatedly he reports striking features or elevations to the commander.

Paul Liefeld listens attentively, just now learns from the flight technician that temperatures, fuel pressure and exhaust gas temperatures are normal. Herbert Georgi, the flight mechanic, is also always reliable, has been so for many years.

"It is a pleasant feeling, to have such a good crew," says the commander.

He himself has worn the uniform for more than two decades. Paul Liefeld is a first class helicopter pilot. He began in the 1950's with an SG-38 training glider of the Society for Sports and Technology.

Suddenly there is a jolt in the helicopter. I am a little afraid, and I look around in surprise. "An evasive maneuver," says the man across from me, a tall airborne soldier. He is familiar with this and smiles at me with understanding.

Now we race across the earth at an altitude of 15 to 20 m. It seems that we can reach the tree tops. Every elevation in the terrain, every group of trees is used for cover, in order to lead the wing as unnoticeably as possible to the crossing. There is radio silence.

The second helicopter on the right suddenly disappears behind some trees. Minutes later, out in the open over a field, the unit is together again. An almost blind understanding, it seems to me. Not even a command was given.

During flight preparation on the previous day, the crews had of course acted it all out, had studied the course of the terrain, the flight path, exactly, and had carefully worked up the documentation in accordance with it. Comrade Liefeld did not dismiss anyone without having first carefully tested him. Their past successes are the result of the hard and tireless work of each individual.

Yes, theory is important, because--according to Paul Liefeld--"even an identical task is never identical, even when I have already flown the course several times." He is thinking of the weather conditions. How fast they can change. And combat conditions can change equally fast. Comrades Boenig and Georgi suddenly pay even closer attention to the surface below. Visibility has gotten even worse. The area of operation is getting closer, and there is a command to regroup for combat. Take the front.

"Switch on weapons system," Comrade Boenig signals, while he does not let the altimeter out of his sight. There--the river. Gray and muddy, it flows on and on. I look out of the porthole and see one of the helicopters next to us. The two pilots in the neighboring helicopter are just as clearly recognizable as are the brightly shining missile containers. And there, beneath me, I can see, in a cloud of dust, the tank and amphibious tank columns racing at high speed toward the river.

Suddenly the helicopter tilts to its side. The formation appears to be literally dissolving.

"Distance 1,200 m," I hear from No. 2. An order is given. "Manuever combat curve." The helicopters race towards the target area.

Comrade Liefeld concentrates on the visor: "Correct angle of elevation, target latitude in the net. 1,000 m." He hears the "combat ready" from 1st Sgt Herbert Georgi, the flight mechanic. And immediately afterwards he pushes the combat button. For a fraction of a second, while the unguided missiles discharge, one can hear the silvergray containers rumbling on the outside.

Our machinegun is firing, and with my bare eyes I can see the impacts on the earth, smoke, water fountains. The other helicopters of the formation are approaching just as fast, and hundreds of missiles hit the opposite bank. Just as in a dive, we veer off to the left in a sharp curve. The repeat attack from another course is begun. Everywhere around I see tactical assault helicopters. Who can find his way around here? Beneath is the dark river. Again the Mi-8 goes on its computed course, and the crew uses the weapons effectively on this second attack flight also. The assault on the opposite bank by the ground forces is prepared. A no less complicated task begins now for the Liefeld wing: Putting down the airborne troops, which must follow immediately.

I look attentively at the faces of the comrades, who are checking over their equipment once more. These men are filled with concentration. But in spite of the tension caused by the imminent landing and combat mission, they radiate tranquility. One thing is certain: these well-trained fighters will give their best in doing their part for the success of the operation.

The helicopters slowly approach the bank, the landing place. The Mi-8's descend like hornets. While the heavy propellers are still hissing through the air, the men jump out of the door in their camouflaged fatigues. They barely have solid ground under their feet, when they begin to charge and open fire with their machine pistols. They disappear from my sight in the smoke of the battlefield.

The flight mechanic quickly closes the door of our helicopter, there is a short moment of hovering, and seconds later we fly off above the river. Soon the entire formation has found together and regrouped. Behind us now the dark river, which is already being crossed by the first tanks. Sweat runs from the forehead of the three comrades in the cockpit. The tensions and efforts of the past minutes become evident.

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CSO: 2300/301

WIEJACZ VIEWS CHANCES FOR DETENTE IN EUROPE

Warsaw SPRAW/ MIEDZYNARODOWE in Polish No 3, Mar 81 pp 7-14

[Text] The Polish nation entered the 1980's under the pressure of events of historical magnitude. The phenomena of deep political, social, and economic crises as well as the process of the socialist renewal of Poland are accompanied by a complex international situation, full of tensions. In fact, the events in Poland and their possible international implications have been listed among the most important events of the past year. Interest abroad in the Polish events--an interest characterized by friendliness and multifaceted assistance in the case of the socialist countries, or an interest motivated by designs contrary to our *raison d'etat* in the case of certain political circles in the West--is a direct result of Poland's position in the politico-military commonwealth of socialist states and in the post-war configuration of political forces in Europe. This interest is, then, a function of the current configuration of the East-West relations. This has to be understood.

At this point we do not know yet how the meeting of the CSCE states-participants in Madrid will end, and which direction in political practice will be favored by the new administration in the United States. Nevertheless, we must pose a question whether the international situation will foster the continuation of the renewal process, or whether tensions in the East-West relations, particularly in Europe, will not hamper, if not stop completely this process. However, before we attempt to answer this question it is necessary to make one general assumption, that is realize the fundamental truth that while the international situation influences the course of our current internal affairs, the course of these affairs impacts on the state of the political relations in Europe. The 7th plenary meeting of the PUPP Central Committee clearly stated that the task of renewal begun in Poland of socio-political life will also foster the strengthening of our ties with allies as well as the political stability in Europe.

The choice of paths for renewal is directly related to the general political climate in the East-West relations, a climate which in the second half of 1980 continued to show the prevalence of detente trends over tension and confrontation tendencies. Also, the prospects of the renewal process depend on the conditions for continuing the policy of detente and universal cooperation between the East and the West. Hence, the involvement of Poland in activities concerning detente, normalization, and stabilization of situation as well as cooperation

in Europe--so common for the Polish foreign policy throughout the entire post-war period--finds now even more concrete expression by relating even more national security interests to domestic needs.

This system of mutual relations and mutual influences presents a great chance in itself, but also a great responsibility. This means that despite economic problems, which will be present for a prolonged period, Poland can still fulfill a vital part in shaping the situation on the European continent as well as in continuing and deepening the changes characteristic for Europe in the 1970's.

I

The decade of the 1980's presents itself as a complex period in the development of the international situation, both on a regional scale in Europe as well as globally. The 1970's were a period of strengthening and concretization of the policy of peaceful coexistence, broadening of cooperation, growth of mutual trust and of growing hopes for achieving concrete progress in efforts aimed at disarmament. The end of the 1970's did not fulfill many of these expectations, and in East-West relations, particularly in U.S.-Soviet relations, the confrontation tendencies began to dominate. The arms race, which has always been the exemplification and function of more general tendencies in the politics of the main actors on the international stage and of the growing distrust in mutual relations, reached the level threatening the lasting results of detente policy, international security, and peace. The arms race has entered a phase which threatens the security of all nations.

The continuing and intensifying arms race is above all the consequence of the doctrine adopted by the leading circles of the North Atlantic Pact and pointing to the absolute necessity of restoring by the NATO as a whole, and particularly by the United States, military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. The politico-military power centers in the United States seem to withdraw from treating the Soviet Union as a partner in politico-military agreements (treaties) on the most fundamental security matters on both the global and regional (e.g., European) scales. The questioning by the United States of the right to presence and participation of the Soviet Union in the solving of burning problems in various regions of the world had to bring about a lessening of mutual trust in relations between these two great powers.

The European situation at the end of the 1970's was particularly negatively affected by the December 1979 NATO decision to place new types of medium range of American nuclear missiles in Europe. This decision ought to be seen in the broader context of the evolution of the NATO military doctrines envisaging the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe. This decision--if it comes to fruition--will place a big question mark over the European policy of detente and cooperation in the decade ahead.

The question arises: how durable is detente without disarmament? What are the limits of immunity of the detente and cooperation processes to the armament decisions of the NATO countries which destabilize the military balance between

the East and the West? The starting point for the discussion and formulation of an answer should be the ascertaining of the factual situation to which the above questions referred to. That is a statement—often expressed by the socialist countries, e.g. in the Warsaw Declaration of States-Parties of the Warsaw Pact of May 1980, or in the communique on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the States-Parties of the Warsaw Pact which took place in October 1980 in Warsaw—that it is impossible to continue the policy of detente and cooperation without achieving a visible progress in the field of arms race stoppage and in disarmament. It can be noted with satisfaction that this statement is presently widely understood, more widely than only a few years ago. This can be exemplified by the discussion at the last session of the UN General Assembly as well as by growing support for the idea of organizing a conference on military relaxation of tension and disarmament in Europe. This can be a source of some optimism for the future.

II

Unfortunately, the rich content policy of detente in Europe of the 1970's has not only failed to bring about disarmament, but has been accompanied by an intensified arms race, which may bury this policy altogether. No level of the disarmament negotiations has brought any progress, even in terms of reflecting the unquestionable results of detente in the political sphere. The states and nations of the world have harbored particularly great hopes for the Soviet-American dialog on the limiting nuclear and strategic armaments. The termination of this dialog as a result of the American postponement of ratification of the Soviet-American treaty on strategic arms limitations (SALT II) has had a negative effect both on the disarmament negotiations in other areas and on entire East-West relations. One may hope that the administration of President Reagan will show more consistency in the dialog with the USSR on limiting nuclear and strategic arms. This dialog—which is of fundamental importance for progress in the sphere detente in the East-West relations—will certainly have a positive impact on the entire relations between the two big powers as well. Poland, like other states sincerely interested in continuing the process of detente, gives total support to the dialog and complete normalization of relations between the USSR and the United States of America.

On the European scale, the most important problem in the field of broadly understood military detente is to achieve progress in the strife for stopping nuclear-missile armaments on our continent.

As it is known, in the fall of 1980 Soviet-American talks on this subject were held in Geneva. We hope that also in this area the present American administration will aim to achieve concrete positive results. There is no shortage of signs from the Soviet side that it is ready to act with the aim of preventing escalation of nuclear-missile armaments in Europe. The results of the dialog will decide the fate of any action on military detente on our continent. A progress in this dialog will help the Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, negotiations which despite their 7-year duration and important political function have not brought concrete agreements.

It can be assumed--considering the present situation probably very optimistically, and yet realistically as well--that this year three levels of disarmament negotiations directly affecting our continent will crystallize: Soviet-American talks on nuclear missile weapons in Europe; Vienna negotiations on armed forces and armament reductions in Central Europe--focusing particularly on conventional forces; and all-European negotiations in the form of a conference on military detente and disarmament on our continent, a conference which in its first stage will primarily focus on the question of broadly understood means to build trust.

Presently, the most vividly debated problem is the European disarmament conference (KOMIR). The socialist countries await the decision by the Madrid Meeting to call such conference. Specific proposals in this respect were presented by Poland in December 1980 in Madrid. They express the position of the socialist countries. Other countries such as members of political-military alliances as well as neutral and nonaligned ones have also presented their own proposals. Although they differ among themselves, sometimes on major issues--e.g. on the character and territorial range of confidence building measures--we do believe that there is a real chance to reach an agreement on calling such conference.

The struggle for progress in the sphere of broadly understood military detente is presently the front line of struggle not only for the shape and content of the detente process, but also for the defense of results of the detente policy of the 1970's. We hope that the progress in the sphere of military detente will bring about an end to the escalation of armaments along with all positive consequences, including economic ones, as well as to bring about a reduction in the role of the military factor in the East-West relations which is an indispensable premise to mitigate dangers inherent in the politico-military divisions in Europe, and thus encourage greater participation of medium-size and small countries on our continent. Poland, like all other states-members of the Warsaw Pact, aims at making the 1980's the decade of limited armaments and of disarmament. This aim was solemnly proclaimed on the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact in the Declaration of its Political Consultative Committee of 15 May 1980. This is a further expression of consistent desire on the part of these countries to continue the detente process and to strengthen international security.

III

The continuing arms race and mutual distrust between opposing politico-military alliances are in the current international situation phenomena with the greatest potential for negative consequences. East-West relations, despite numerous gains in the area of cooperation, still continue to exhibit the deep divisions, confrontations, and rivalries. Moreover, other sources of potential and real conflicts and tensions have appeared: increased differences in the standard of living between "rich North" and "poor South," food and demographic problems in the Third World, ecologic and energy problems. Many of them have been observed in Europe, and in our country as well. They will certainly have an impact on the international scene. Historically, economic reasons have always been the source of tensions and conflicts. That is why the existing situation and dangers

ought to encourage, if not force governments and societies to cooperate and look for a common denominator such as the common interest of mankind. Thus the coming years will be filled--if we accept the optimistic variant--with searching for solutions to problems and phenomena adversely affecting societies, states, and continents.

The decade of the 1980's will present itself as the period of increased hopes and practical actions in the direction of increased cooperation and shared responsibility for the development of international lives of all countries. The symptoms of this can be seen already today, particularly at the United Nations which has presently over 150 states as its members. Every new member, after obtaining formal independence, strives to free itself from various forms of neo-colonial and factual dependence, and to real participation in shaping international relations.

In regard to the European continent, the principle of participation and shared responsibility is an inherent part of the process begun in Helsinki in 1975. The postulate or even imperative of democratization of international relations come out of the cultural heritage of the European nations, and out of the richness of their historical experience, sometimes a very bitter one. The opinions heard in the West about the decline in importance of the CSCE Final Act have no foundations and are used to undermine or distort the meaning of the process begun in Helsinki. The Final Act still should be treated as the basis of a long-term process of building a durable system of security and cooperation in Europe as an instrument of active work of all of its signatories for detente, disarmament, and cooperation. Nonallied and other medium- and small-size states see in the CSCE process also a chance for a stronger affirmation of their existence and of making a greater contribution to the shape of contemporary Europe and to the emphasizing of her identity. The socialist countries have always been against the policy of dividing Europe into two antagonistic politico-military alliances. On numerous occasions they have expressed their readiness to dissolve the Warsaw Pact provided that it is accompanied by a simultaneous dissolution of NATO, and as the first step in this direction they proposed limiting of military activities of both alliances and liquidation of their military organizations. These proposals have not been accepted by the other side. But even in the current conditions the CSCE states-participants do not want to allow further European divisions in various areas of life. They strive to come up with mutually agreeable steps which will have contributed to the increase of mutual trust, and in more distant future to the increase of chances of acting together in order to solve the most difficult problems facing mankind. The awareness of common fate and the acceptance of the necessity to cooperate are indispensable conditions for the solution of common problems of a given continent or of the entire globe.

The perspectives of the currently held Meeting in Madrid--a very important form of many-sided continuation of the CSCE process--depend most of all on the development of the general international situation and on shaped by this political will of its participants. If there is no unexpected international event, one can expect certain--modest perhaps, but still greater than in Belgrade-- results of the Meeting. They will be contained, among others, in the decision

starting the process leading to the European disarmament conference (an important activity of the European countries aiming at complementing political detente by military detente), and in agreements on increased cooperation in such fields as energy, environmental protection, culture, and education. One cannot also exclude new agreements in the humanitarian field such as uniting families, allowing mixed marriages which ease the movement of persons, etc.

The continuation of the CSCE process does not take place in isolation from events and processes taking place in other parts of the world. It is practically impossible, then, to completely protect the achievement to date of the detente process in Europe and its further development from negative influences of tensions and rivalries occurring outside Europe. Being aware of the fact that in the present configuration of political forces in the world the pragmatic usefulness of the thesis of indivisibility of detente is rather very limited, we are decisively against the thesis of indivisibility of tensions. We have done and continue to do everything to realize the idea of creating all-European system of security and cooperation on our politically divided continent. We also contribute to the peaceful solution of conflicts outside Europe honoring the necessity to guarantee all nations their irrefutable right to independence and free growth.

The most fundamental and elementary function of the state is to guarantee a nation internal and external security. The Polish People's Republic considers her main task to secure for her country and society peaceful conditions for growth. Our country has subordinated all instruments of her foreign policy to this fundamental task.

Peaceful foreign policy of our country--which is conducted with maximum involvement--has a deep historical justification; it draws conclusions from tragic and painful experiences of the nation. The Polish nation, which has a very special attitude toward its history and which identifies with its heroic and independence trends, considers such policy as its own and irrefutable treasure. The feature which has characterized the political outlook of the Polish society in the entire postwar period was the unanimity in giving the highest priority to the involvement of the people's state in the activity to achieve international security and peace. This unanimity is one of the most valuable achievements in the history of the postwar Poland. Natural differences in views on various internal affairs have not and do not weaken this unanimity.

The result of political education of our society during the 36 postwar years is its complete awareness of Poland's place in the European power structure as an important element in the balance of power on this continent. The weakening of this element as a result of activities leading to crisis situations in Poland creates a danger of violating the entire political structure in Europe as well as undermines durability of the order established at the Yalta conference, and confirmed at Potsdam and at the conference in 1975 at Helsinki.

A particularly important element of this collective wisdom of the nation is its complete understanding of the importance of Poland's alliances for her security and universal growth, of her unshakeable place in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, and

of the importance of her friendship ties and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist states. In divided Europe, Poland's place is on the socialist side. At the same time we try--within our powers--to mitigate these European divisions, and to deepen the feeling of common fate among European nations and states, which are based on the assumption that Poland's security is related to the security of the entire European continent.

In the nationwide debate on the state of our affairs which has been continuing for months now no authentic political force in Poland and no segment of the Polish society--if we disregard the few individuals who are either injudicious or hostile to the socialist system--has not challenged the fundamental values and directions of our foreign policy. Thus, the concern on the part of the socialist states, particularly our neighbors, but also in other European states, is caused not by a challenge of the Polish foreign policy within the framework of the socialist renewal movement in Poland--because such challenge has not taken place and is not taking place now--but most of all by the lack of social and economic stability. Thus, it is not a paradox, but a logical consequence of a universal belief, that the Polish *raison d'etat* viewed today through the prism of Polish relations with abroad is today the basic element keeping our society together. The line of understanding covers today above all the preservation and maintaining of political capital, which we have gained--both on domestic and international levels--through our activities on the international stage, an activity which has won our Motherland respect and approval in the community of socialist states and in the entire international community.

January 1981.

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CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS OF VOIVODSHIPS DESCRIBED

Poznan Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 4, Apr 80 pp 20-33

[Article by Col Ryszard Ronda, chief of the Poznan Voivodship Civil Defense Inspectorate: "Some Experiences From Civil Defense Activity on the Territory of Poznan Voivodship"]

[Text] Recently, we celebrated the 24th anniversary of Civil Defense (CD) of the Polish Peoples Republic. We surveyed our achievements in the CD arena, and determined the direction of our further activity. We noted with satisfaction that the past years were a period of considerable achievements and innovative solutions. Continued development and strengthening of CD necessitates the intensification of our work, and its elevation to a higher level. The use of innovative forms and methods of operation can play a considerable role in obtaining optimal results.

For this reason also, it is indispensable that they be presented in the columns of PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ, so that they may be circulated through the country and used advantageously by all parties concerned. In this publication, I am trying to present to the readers certain experiences from CD activity in Poznan Voivodship.

Functioning of the Voivodship CD Personnel Training Center

In the totality of CD missions carried out within each voivodship, the proper training of leadership personnel and CD forces play a very substantive role. Cognizant of the great importance of personnel training within the staff of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate after having studied the economic-organizational conditions and capabilities, it is searching for various solutions to this problem. The most suitable one turned out to be the formation of a Voivodship CD Personnel Training Center based physically at a suitable labor establishment or institution. We found such a base with a suitable infrastructure, large enough for the training center.

Pursuant to the appropriate decisions and concluded agreements, the Voivodship CD Personnel Training Center was set up in the facilities of a veterinary hospital. It

has ten rooms with sleeping accommodations for two or three persons apiece that are rated in Category I according to the standards of the WKFiT [Main Committee for Physical Culture and Tourism], fully equipped rooms used also as libraries and reading rooms, lecture halls which accommodate 30, and storage areas for training support purposes.

In view of its location in the proximity of the Group of Agricultural Schools in Wrzesnia, it simultaneously functions as an instruction base for defense training teachers of intermediate schools and postgraduate studies of the veterinary service.

The high level of voivodship agriculture and the high marketability of its production account for the particular interest in CD in that area.

In the case of the organization by the center of courses for instructor and leadership personnel of the veterinary service CD formations, the possibility exists of using all the locally available equipment. The entire equipment of the veterinary hospital, suitable for instructional exercises, with the students of the local Veterinary Technical School is also available.

Providing the attendees with suitably good living conditions, together with the friendly approach of the center leadership, the school personnel, and the lecturers, have created a favorable atmosphere since the first day of their arrival. This has helped the realization of the training tasks, which are characterized by considerable effort in the exercises. The fact that we managed to find a suitable person as head of the center has great bearing here too. He is reserve Colonel Zygmunt Marciniński, the Voivodship inspector in charge of training CD personnel. He is a person with great organizational and instructional experience, high ethical, moral, and intellectual quality, who is devoting his knowledge and energy to the matter of training. The Voivodship CD Inspectorate gave him considerable power in the fulfillment of the important matters of the center and training.

The training tasks set up by the obligatory program are realized by a well selected instructional staff consisting in the main of workers of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate. Each one conducts exercises in a narrowly limited speciality connected with the service position occupied. Workers of the territorial CD inspectors and permanent workers of the hospital who received authorizations as Class I CD Instructors in the speciality of veterinary service and plant protection as a result of our purposeful activity, were also attached to the staff.

In order to upgrade the teaching qualifications of the instructors of the center, we are organizing lessons in the Institute of Teaching Methods of the Adam Mickiewicz University. In addition, the instructional staff raised their qualifications through self-instruction, mainly on the basis of training materials that we obtain from the IOCK [National Civil Defense Institute] and the organized programmed training for personnel staff officer exercises, and demonstration exercises using the equipment of specific CD services. The training staff of the center has at its disposal an ample and modern training base and a large number of training aids of the publishing houses of the IOSK, the Ministry of National Defense and the Military Sciences Society, training materials of the COSK OC [Central National CD Training Center], along with our own works. We have available a complete set of equipment specified in the billing tables (worked out by the IOCK).

All undertakings connected with the organization and equipping of the center were carried out by workers of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate with the help of various Voivodship institutions, without investment outlays.

During the process of teaching the students, we make use of audio-visual aids. The following is used: tape recorders with a full set of tapes containing verbal and musical programs on the subject of CD--from the recording studio of the Polish Army Institute, "Lech" type graphical display units with an ample set of foliograms [pages for reflective display], slide projectors, movie equipment, slides, a complete set of films on the subject of CD, posters, visual tables, diagrams, and photographs connected thematically with the mandatory programs of teaching individual trainee groups.

We have free use of the printing facilities of the Vojevodship Office, to turn out the appropriate sets of publications, diagrams, and pictures for the needs of the center. This allows us to increase the effectiveness of training, to save the time of the trainees in the labor-intensive resketching or retracing of various pictures, sets of documents, etc.

We are organizing 21 courses per year. We are training 500 persons, including personnel for other voivodships also. The total annual cost of operating the center amounts to 380,000 zlotys.

I think that in the existing economic situation of the country with its investment difficulties, our experience in this subject can become a guide in solving problems in other voivodships.

The trained CD leadership and instructional personnel in a center organized this way is an important accomplishment of our voivodstvo.

We will always remember the people with whom we are conducting this program, and upon whom depend, among other things, the technical base, the physical facilities, and the equipment, and on whom our ability to realize the training goals now and in the future depend.

The Use of Local Mass Information Media in Poznan Voivodship for Publicizing and Propagating Civil Defense

The publicizing and propagation of CD information in local mass media within our voivodship is realized with the support of "The Guidelines for the Organization and Directions of Political Propaganda Activity in the Field of Publicizing CD" signed by Comrade Jerzy Lukaszewicz, Secretary of the PWP CC. Pursuant to these guidelines, local mass media are realizing the fundamental political propaganda activity with respect to the preparation and undertakings of CD within the area of their activity.

The programmed activity has been developed primarily by the Polish Radio and the Television Center Station in Poznan, the editorial staffs of the dailies GAZETA ZACHODNIA (the organ of the PWP executive Committee), GLOW WIELKOPOLSKI, EXPRESS POZNANSKI, and the institutional newspapers ZYCIE POMETU, GLOS ZALOGI, ZYCIA WPK, NOWINY, ELEKTROCHEMIA, STOMILOWIEC, ABC LECHIA, SEGMENTY, NASZA TRYBUNA, MOTOWIDLO, and PRZEMIANY ZIEMI GNIEZNIENSKIEJ.

This activity is supported by over 80 wire radio broadcasting centers. It can be stated that the press, Polish Radio, and television are carrying out the leading role in our territory from among the mass media engaged in publicizing the ideas, goals, and tasks of CD, and propagating knowledge in the CD field.

Thanks to the concept of planned and coordinated activities and training conducted by the Voivodship CD Personnel Training Center, and with the involvement of the editorial and correspondent groups, our publicity goals have been realized with ever increasing results and knowledge in the field.

During the course of the year, about 260 informational articles, reports, and notes have been published in the local and institutional press. More and more frequently, in articles concerning socio-political, economic, and volunteer blood donation activities, emphasis is given to the active and inspiring participation of the staff and members of CD formations. We have established working contacts with the representatives of journals in Poznan (ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI and WIRAZE).

The Polish Radio in Poznan and Porman TV provide time for the programmed problems of CD (amounting to 25 minutes in Polish Radio, and 30 minutes on TV per year). (sic) The contents of the broadcasts are mainly reports on the rescue actions and exercises of CD bodies and forces, demonstrations of protection of animals, pastures, and water intakes from contamination, and other information concerning natural calamities, effective community work, etc. We operate for the purpose of obtaining the sympathy of individuals in TV and Polish Radio with respect to the publicizing of CD. We already have persons actively working. We are now expanding and enhancing the numbers of such persons. The CD problems are becoming the subject of broadcasts in the wire radio centers. On an annual scale, 970 programs with a total time of 195 hours are being broadcast.

Having in mind the continuous improvement of the publicity forms used in mass media, and seeking new forms, we are initiating activities for the purpose of spreading the readership and subscribership of PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ. The publicizing of PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ is conducted in local administrative bodies, among leadership personnel and members of CD formations, among lecturers and instructors in training the populace, and also readers concerned with problems of protection and rescue. Thus, year after year, the readership and subscribership of our journal are increasing. A 15 percent increase of subscribers is planned for 1980. During the time of organization of training in various groups, centers, and preparations for exercises of CD formations, the Voivodship CD Inspectorate recommends the study of selected articles from PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ. In our own area, we develop, print, and distribute leaflets (several thousands of copies of each circulated), of compact content, concerning alarm signals and the protection against contamination and poisoning of food, water, animals, pastures, and plants.

Cooperation of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate With Departments of the Voivodship Administration and Paramilitary Organizations

The successful realization of CD tasks of Poznan Voivodship depends, among other things, upon the actual cooperation of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate with departments of the Voivodship Administration and paramilitary organizations. We are aware of this and understand the essence of CD and our role in it. In order to create the possibilities and foundations of good cooperation of the bureaus of the Voivodship

Administration, everything has been done in an official and legal way. The main matters are regulated by the appropriate regulations in the Statute of the Voivodship concerning the realization of annual tasks in consultation with the specialized departments, units of the basic level, etc. In mentioning cooperation with the departments, it is worth emphasizing the good atmosphere that the Voivodship Administration creates for the constructive and effective work of all organizational units.

The Voivodship Inspectorate, recognizing its place in the system of realizing CD tasks, is considered to be one of the departments of the Voivodship Administration and identifies itself fully with the administration, its socio-economic, organizational, and political affairs, etc. The Inspectorate leadership participates on an equal footing with the leadership of other departments in the organized training, briefings, and consultations. We draw conclusions that apply to us, observe cooperation with other departments, and, if possible, we make use of any positive development. In practical activity, we consult, teach, and confer on how to prepare, plan, and realize CD undertakings. Often, we also help other departments (of equal rank) in the execution of their specialized tasks--essentially outside the CD area. The units know and value our help. This cooperation of the workers of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate is characterized by consistence with respect to CD matters, modesty in action, and the proper respect for other workers of the administration. In fulfilling the tasks and missions assigned us, in relation to the departments of the Voivodship Administration, we do not give orders, we do not issue commands, and we do not boss the show. We fulfill our missions at the appropriate time, the proper place, and on our own level. I wish to emphasize that cooperation of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate with the Voivodship Defense Committee Secretariat in the realization of the primary goal of executing defense tasks is characterized by good relations and cooperation. We operate in a coordinated and unanimous manner, which makes our efforts more potent and effective, and increases our mutual authority. It must also be stressed that cooperative relations are set up in a similar way with the Voivodship Military Headquarters and with paramilitary units and organizations.

The cooperation of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate and other departments of the Voivodship Administration with paramilitary organizations is regulated by an order (No. 64/177) of the Poznan Voivodship governor (dated 14 September 1977) with respect to the coordination of the activity of departments of the Voivodship Administration during the period of cooperation with associations and the provision of help to them. Cooperation with paramilitary organizations is realized by the Voivodship CD Inspectorate by means of: support and encouragement of their socially useful initiatives, joining organizations towards the realization of CD missions, consultation with organizations on matters connected with their area of activity and affecting CD problems, and the holding of local meetings for discussing the role and scope of activity of organizations on behalf of CD.

In suggesting to organizations that they pay heed in their activity to CD problems, and make use of material at the disposal of the organizations for activity concerning CD, the Voivodship CD Inspectorate never violates the autonomy and internal discipline of the organizations. In order to maintain constant contact and to assure cooperation with paramilitary organizations and the provision of direct aid to them, so-called "constant guardians" have been designated from among the workers of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate. The fact that nearly all our workers are registered as members of

one of the organizations and are very active as members facilitates the realization of Voivodship CD Inspectorate goals in the organizations. This organizational setup makes it possible for us to present CD matters at meetings of these same organizations and to develop training in the CD field among their members. We are also aware of the fact that all cooperating parties should derive advantages from good cooperation. Thus, in cooperation with paramilitary organizations, we adopted the principle of treating them as partners, on the basis of mutual advantages and comradeship. An example of such cooperation is the provision of help to organizations in conducting training exercises and competitions, the participation of Voivodship CD Inspectorate personnel in the judging committees, help in the area of material-technical supply for events, etc. We do not consider our forms of cooperation thus far with paramilitary to be something completed and closed. We continually search for new and attractive methods.

Including the Conclusions From Inter-Voivodship, Voivodship and Local Exercises in CD Plans

The practical exercises of various types in the CD system offer conclusions of a planning, organizational, operational-technical, and training nature to the Voivodship CD Inspectorate leadership personnel participating in them. We make a practice of having conclusions of a general nature and those more specifically applicable to the concrete situation of our voivodship drawn from our participation in such exercises and worked out in written form.

These conclusions become a subject of discussions within the leadership staff. They are subsequently brought to the awareness of volunteer workers of the Voivodship CD Inspectorates, the leaders of local CD inspectorates, workers officially engaged in the realization of defense missions in departments of the administration, groups, and units subordinate to the voivodship governor, during the course of internal training and briefings. The chief of the Inspectorate presents certain conclusions to the Voivodship Administration leadership.

Undertakings pursuant to these conclusions are reflected in the annual plans of CD goals to the voivodship, in CD plan documents, and also in specific organizational structures and operational-technical plans. The degree of acceptance and inclusion of undertakings from these conclusions, drawn from exercises, is also a subject of control and accounting of the execution of tasks.

I wish to say that up until now, every exercise has yielded a great deal of interesting informative material and has encouraged and stimulated individual solutions, comparisons, and self-critical evaluation of one's own activity. There are many practical effects of the inclusion of such conclusions. On the basis of experiences and conclusions of the exercises in which we participated, the system of detecting and analyzing contamination in Poznan Voivodship was checked out, and the optimal quantity of its elements for the existing conditions was established. This system was integrated with the elements of the over-all warning and alarm system. The plan for conducting rescue operations in Poznan city was modified. Under the influence of the experience from the exercises, we perceived the question of dividing the city into sectors, the activation of rescue forces, and their material-technical supply and leadership differently than before.

We received considerable encouragement from the exercises in the matter of decentralizing the population at the stage of developing plans. We checked out the documents for transporting the decentralized inhabitants through the facilities of the Polish State Railways, the State Motor Transport, and the Voivodship Transportation Enterprise Directorate in Poznan. We acquainted many people with the totality of the very complex problems, and calling attention to the conclusions derived from them, even before the decentralization preparations themselves and the transporting of the population from Poznan. We then provided the means to them to meet the various requirements of wartime. The methodology used by us of developing and including the conclusions from the exercise and training conducted in a different form are effective thus far. Thus, since all of our conscious activity has to undergo continuous improvement, we shall teach ourselves new forms and solutions or look for them from others in order to attain even better results.

Biala Podlaska Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 3, Mar 81 pp 8-11

[Interview with Jozef Piela, Governor and Chief of Biala Podlaska Voivodship, by Grazyna Dembowska; date and place not specified]

[Text] The basic problems of civil defense stem from the specifics of the territory, its operational characteristics, and its economic and manpower potential.

Other matters are brought to the fore and solved in their own particular way in highly-industrialized regions with high population densities. The pattern of defense preparations is quite different. For example, in territories of a rural nature, which actually are potentially less threatened than large densely settled areas, but where the conduct of protective activities is no less important during critical moments, defense preparations can still be the deciding life-and-death factor for the populace. More on this subject is given in the interview made with Biala Podlaska Voivodship governor Jozef Piela by PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ.

[Question] What matters are the main object of the activities of CD in Biala Podlaska Voivodship. What are these activities aimed at?

[Answer] The general goal of all of our initiatives in the area of CD is the proper preparation of the voivodship, its inhabitants, and its economy for defense in case of a threat to the security of the state and during the time of war, and also for complex peacetime situations, when it is necessary to face natural catastrophes or other occurrences having potentially unfortunate results.

Biala Podlaska Voivodship is a typical agricultural voivodship--over 60 percent of the inhabitants are engaged in farming, and it is their basic source of support. So, it is an obvious fact that the main thrust of CD preparations of this territory--aside from the natural protection of the population--is the improvement of the

system of protecting domestic animals, food, agricultural crops, pastures, and water from the results of the effects of mass destruction weapons, and especially against contamination. Therefore, both the organization of CD forces in the voivodship, and the type or structure of training for them are adapted to these very protective needs. We are concentrating attention on the undertakings realized by the local units--the communes and village units. I must emphasize--as practical experience shows--of inestimable importance for our work is the attitude of the commune heads and village administrators and their involvement in these undertakings, all the more so, since they fulfill a certain military function as CD officials and representatives of the lowest link of administrative authority. In each commune unit, we have one or two local civil defense detachments. Currently, we are aiming toward the maximum improvement of the structures of the CD forces of rural regions (relative to the tasks anticipated for them during peacetime and wartime), that would assure them a high degree of maneuverability. For apportioning defense and self-defense duties within the entire population of all village-administrator's offices, they have been organized into rural self-defense groups.

The preference that we give to problems of protection of agriculture that stems from the specific situation of the voivodship does not mean in any way that CD matters in labor establishments have been moved off into the background. Here also, both in the production establishments and in the service establishments, quite a lot is being done really. However, we observe a difference in the level of their preparation for CD (anyway, this same phenomenon shows up in the communes). In order to level out these differences, we are organizing, among other things, a series of working meetings in the enterprises that are leading in this capacity and are propagating their best experiences.

[Question] In view of the large number of production and economic tasks, are not the civil defense preparations being carried out now an additional load for the personnel of labor institutions, farmers, as well as for you, Citizen Governor, as the head of the Biala Podlaska region?

[Answer] I cannot imagine that the governor, who has been charged with the totality of the socio-economic life in the voivodship, could not find time for this activity. Anyway, every person in every work position has to keep in mind the necessity for preparations for defense in case of danger. The awareness of the necessity of the very protection of the populace, the region, the country is essential. This awareness must be deeply instilled in all of us. Any other concept and action would be simply a proof of carelessness, and the ignoring of obvious truths. Here, I would also want to add that CD is also very necessary for us in the normal peacetime life of the voivodship. For example, the participation of its formations in fighting natural catastrophes and for counteracting their results is important for us. We are a voivodship located along the Bug River. The Bug channel is not regulated and floods are a rather frequent occurrence. We have had a chance to test out the value of the help of the CD forces in such circumstances many times already.

[Question] And are they really prepared for this kind of activity?

[Answer] I consider that they are suitably prepared for this and are fulfilling these functions excellently. But this is not everything. In case of need, they are also

conducting considerable work useful for their own environment that are also necessary for the economy of the country. Returning to the question, I shall also add--and this is a matter of no small importance--that the activities of CD are accepted with understanding and acceptance by the society of our voivodship. This is most particularly manifested in its participation in anti-flood activities, which we have mentioned before, in firefighting, and in eliminating the effects of windstorms. At such times, disputes among neighbors and mutual animosities are set aside, and the only thing that is important is rescue and the protection of lives and property. Anyway, this has become such a commonplace thing in our society already (and this is proven by a number of facts from Polish history), that whenever something endangers this society, it closes ranks and mobilizes all of its forces. This is a positive manifestation.

[Question] How is the realization of CD tasks proceeding at present?

[Answer] We asserted in the past already that the recapitulation of the activity of the past year has a mobilizing effect on the realization of CD tasks. We have been applying this for years already. The recapitulation is of a working nature and is conducted in three groups: chiefs of cities, city-communes, and communes, and directors (or their equivalent) of the Voivodship Administration. Those whose activity brings results are distinguished publicly, by name, whereas the names of those who could operate more effectively are missing. As a result of such a method of evaluation of individual units, a true rivalry has been created between them and the benefit of this for CD has been obvious.

We intensified the training of leadership organs of units of all levels and commands of CD detachments. Unfortunately, the process of training is being impeded by the lack of a permanent base for this purpose. Aside from this, it is proceeding correctly.

The various types of exercises organized thus far in Biala Podlaska have concerned, primarily, all the most essential CD problems of our territory. For example, in the communes which are supposed to receive the inhabitants decentralized from cities known to be in particular danger, according to CD plans, this phase of decentralization operation was the subject of exercises. Flood control activities have been improved in the cities and communes of the Bug region. In the communes with highly developed agricultural production and food processing establishments, we are concentrating on the protection of water, food, pastures, and agricultural crops and domestic animals from contamination and poisoning. The task of an exercise of specialized CD forces was the attainment of full readiness as a basis for forming and regrouping zones of activities and deploying themselves under field conditions. The general principle in this is an actual joining together of defense and economic missions. Even during the autumn of last year, in spite of the well-known difficulties in agriculture, exercises on the commune level were conducted--and this was done at the initiative of the commune chiefs.

We managed, although not completely, to integrate the current activity of economic units with CD activity, and also to bring about closer cooperation among organs such as the Voivodship Military Headquarters, the Voivodship Headquarters of the Citizens Militia, the Voivodship Headquarters of Service to Poland, and social organizations--National Defense League, the Polish Red Cross, and shortwave fan clubs and CD clubs.

Cooperation between the Voivodship CD Inspectorate and the Voivodship Military Headquarters and the Secretariat of the Voivodship Organizational Committee, and also with departments of the Voivodship Administration is turning out well. This is a necessary condition for realizing the CD tasks that require the consolidation of efforts of all of these links, which are responsible for the defense readiness of the voivodship. I am limiting myself to the presentation of only some of the most important matters, but, one can see that the realization of CD tasks in the voivodship is a subject of broad coverage.

[Question] What has complicated the realization of plans in the CD field? Have the difficulties that our country has been recently experiencing been also unfavorably reflected in our CD preparations?

[Answer] Of course, we are struggling with numerous shortages--in supply, in the training material base, and with other things. And bringing attention to the conditions in which civil defense is operating in our territory, I can boldly state, that truly a great deal has been done with existing possibilities. The realization of tasks has not brought about so many difficulties now and in the last several years as compared to the problems that were the natural consequence of the creation of a new voivodship which was the result of the 1975 administrative reform.

The production potential of the territory of Biala Podlaska, both the industrial and the construction potential, is very weak. The decision of establishing the voivodship, however, awakened greater aspirations of its inhabitants--which comes as no surprise. The society tied considerable hopes to this fact and counted on more intense development and investments. At the same time, it was not possible to satisfy social needs in any measure, even the most urgent and most important ones, as had been expected by the voivodship inhabitants. In addition, many tasks were levied that had to be realized, making use of the weak potential. This example is important, even from the defense standpoint. Hospitals were built before 1975 in two independent administrative units, in Biala Podlaska and Radzyn powiats. Later, both of these powiats ended up in one voivodship. Therefore, we had to realize two investment projects simultaneously of high labor and capital intensity for our capacity to achieve. The needs of the inhabitants also grew and the influx of people into the new voivodship brought with it the necessity for accelerating the housing construction program. The needs of CD also reached a new scale at the voivodship level. Currently, the object of greatest concern is the completion of the construction of the facility in which there would be space for the storage of CD equipment of the voivodship, and which would simultaneously fulfill the function of a permanent training center.

[Question] And what are the main goals for the immediate future?

[Answer] Along with the many actions undertaken by us, the lowest CD link, such as the village, will continue to require particular concern. What this concerns is that the village self-defense groups have to be really prepared for their functions and would systematically check out and improve their readiness. We will be involving the Voivodship Administration to a greater degree than thus far in activities concerning the commune CD links. Specific departments of the Voivodship Administration (the Department of Agriculture and others) will have to be fully responsible for CD preparations in the commune level sections under their jurisdiction. Of course, the improvement of CD in labor establishments will also continue to be a task of current

concern. I note that there is always much to be done in both of these areas. I see in this a major role for the Voivodship Civil Defense Inspectorate--the coordinator of preparations on the part of the voivodship authorities and the Voivodship Organization Commission.

[Question] Are there units or individuals in the voivodship that merit special recognition, who are attaining better results in CD preparations than are others?

[Answer] But of course! For example, among the communes the leading one is the Janow Podlaski commune, which boasts of its attainments in all the areas of CD activity. Among the labor establishments, there is the Irrigation and Land Improvement Equipment Repair Enterprise in Biala Podlaska. Jerzy Barczynski, the director of the enterprise, in paying considerable attention to matters that are the subject of CD concerns, takes particular care of getting CD tasks realized in a planned way and at a high level. However, the activity of the entire health service is proceeding in first place on the voivodship level, and quite a bit of the credit for this goes to Jan Zukowski, MD, the Voivodship health officer.

It is an obvious fact that the level of CD preparation in the voivodship is primarily the result of the systematic tenacious work of the Voivodship Civil Defense Inspectorate. Its chief, Lt Col Adam Olesinski, is widely known because of his great inventiveness and effective procedures in this area.

[Question] In the name of our readers and the editorial board of PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ, and speaking for myself as well, I sincerely thank you, Citizen Governor, for this conversation.

And I promise the readers of PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ a detailed story on my visit to the labor establishments of Biala Podlaska and the Janow Podlaski commune in one of the coming issues.

Lodz Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 3, Mar 81 pp16-19

[Article by Mgr. Jozef Niewiadomski, President of the City of Lodz and Civil Defense Chief of Lodz Voivodship: "CD Achievements of Lodz City Voivodship from 1975 to 1980"]

[Text] The 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of CD Falling in 1981 Leads One to Reflect Upon and Appraise its Achievements.

The current state of CD is the result of consistent and creative continuation of the previous stages of development--territorial anti-aircraft defense and universal self-defense. Each of these stages is the development of new specific forms of CD. The Resolution of the Council of Ministers on Civil Defense issued 18 May 1973 and the 1975 reform of territorial organs of state administration were of decisive importance for CD preparations. This resolution, along with the executive acts, is a new higher stage of CD preparations of the voivodship. The CD organizational structures were adjusted to the newly-created operating conditions and also--to qualitatively different theoretical principles, and previous experiences permitted a

relatively rapid work-up of effective and differentiated forms and methods of operation, which facilitate the achievement of the goals set forth. The new CD organizational structures in the units of the territorial organs of state administration of the voivodship were purposeful and appropriate. The situation and nature of the voivodship and its industrialization required us to have a grasp of the individual preparations of the responsible leadership organs and CD forces and their equipment.

One of the first elements of these preparations was the precise definition of tasks for the departments of the city administration, the territorial associations, and the basic level state administrative units. The principle was adopted that CD assignments must be realized on a level with other assignments by each organizational unit. The planned, over-all control of projects in the CD field was introduced. Depending upon the nature and specifics of the unit undergoing control, the control groups consisted of the representatives of other departments of the city administration of Lodz, and of associations in addition to representations of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate, the Voivodship Defense Committee, the Voivodship Military Headquarters, and the Social-administrative Department. These controls have as a purpose the verification of the immediate state of operations and the provision of help in order to eliminate difficulties.

At meetings of the Voivodship Defense Committee and at periodic briefings devoted to the problems of CD, periodic accounting is carried out by the directors of the departments, associations, and basic level CD chiefs of the realization of CD tasks.

The basis of the activity is realistic planning and the regular realization of CD plans. "The Plan for the Development of Civil Defense of the City Voivodstvo of Lodz in 1976-80" was of particular importance. It contained the fundamental undertakings aimed at raising the status of CD of the voivodship to a higher level based upon the mandatory prescriptions and real capabilities. This document and the guidelines of the Chief of CD of Poland were the basis for the work-up of annual plans of all organizational units of the voivodship. Worthy of note are the preparations of the initial data for the development of CD plans for all organizational units, and also the model plans for CD.

The annual plans of administrative units were checked out and updated during the course of exercises of the CD forces. An example of this are the exercises "Ziemia Lodzka-77," "Warta-78," and "Lodz-80". The continuous analysis of the exercises and the conclusions drawn from them served for the improvement of the CD plans.

An important achievement during the past five-year plan was the completion of the construction of general warning systems in several cities, and their further restructuring in others. These systems have been adapted to central control, and are maintained in full technical readiness. A real achievement is the installation of radio telephones without any financial outlays and with the participation of the technical workers of the Voivodship CD Inspectorate. It forms a general alarm network, and is also used for transmitting urgent administrative decisions from the voivodstvo to districts, cities, cities and communes, and communes. In order to increase reliability and effectiveness, the communications equipment connected into the alarm system will be at the disposal of the Voivodship Firefighting Command, the Citizens Militia, the Polish State Railways, and also the Lodz stations of Polish Radio and Television. The organizational principles and technical solutions fully assure the early warning and protection of the populace in the event of danger from the air.

A voivodship system for detecting contamination has also been organized. Teams of personnel have been trained and have been furnished the needed equipment. In the course of exercises, this system is perfected and improved from an organizational standpoint.

In shelter construction, we made a detailed analysis of the needs and capabilities of territories that assure the initiation of planning-documentation work for preparing an appropriate quantity of accommodations in shelter structures for the crews of labor establishments and the population. A group of specialists was called upon who were trained by the Voivodship CD Inspectorate in planning shelter structures. The training of leadership personnel was aimed at preparing them for the realization of CD tasks during peacetime, and also during danger and war, by means of lessons, training sessions, and leadership-staff exercises. During the last five-year plan, three leadership-staff exercises were conducted with the leading CD bodies of the voivodship, one of these with the use of rescue forces within the framework of the "Ziemia Lodzka-77" inter-voivodship exercises. The exercises made it possible to verify the concept of leading the CD of the voivodship and intensified the capabilities of the CD leadership staff in realizing the tasks during the time of danger and war.

Group commands of rescue units and groups for handling the preparation and implementation of decentralization of the populace were called up and trained. The training of 100 percent of the leadership personnel of the territorial CD formations through a system of courses was an achievement. In order to simplify and generalize views in organizational and training problems, demonstration-training exercises were organized for the leadership CD personnel of territorial and basic level CD. In addition to the training and organizational goals, they also fulfill propaganda tasks. An important element of education is the useful social work that is realized during the time of these exercises. Their worth in our voivodship during the past five-year plan is estimated at 14 million zlotys. The CD formations of the city and commune in Aleksandrow Lodzki and the town of Glownie are leading in this respect.

The training of leadership personnel necessitated the preparation of a suitable training base. Method training rooms were organized at the Voivodship CD Inspectorate and in three district CD inspectorates. They are in the process of being organized in the other districts and towns.

The Voivodship CD Inspectorate, by agreement with the Office of the Superintendent of Education and Upbringing, with the support of the commune schools, is organizing CD training centers in every commune. Preparatory work is in progress. The greater part of the aid for the training offices was done in social actions by the CD personnel, which reduced financial outlays considerably, limiting such outlays to the purchase of audio-visual equipment.

Considerable attention was given to basic training of the crews of labor establishments, as well as people not belonging to organizations--the inhabitants of towns and villages. We cover about 40,000 persons on the average per year in this type of training. Constant improvement is conducted at the annual course-conferences of the instructor staff for various specialties, intermediate school defense training teachers, and military studies instructors. A major role in training and instruction for CD is carried out by social organizations, especially the Polish Red Cross, the Volunteer Firefighters Association, the National Defense League, and the Volunteer Reserve of Citizens' Militia.

The military studies at the higher educational establishments of our voivodship are making a notable contribution in preparing personnel for CD. In realizing their teaching assignments, they are preparing students for the leadership-instruction functions that are especially applicable in CD formations, and have at their disposal a properly prepared training base equipped with audio-visual and specialized equipment. The military studies at Lodz University, the Academy of Medicine, all the art schools, and Lodz Polytechnic Institute deserve to be singled out.

The defense training of the youth fulfills a very important role in preparing society for CD. It is the primary, most universal, and fundamental form of preparing the population for self-defense. During the years 1975 through 1980, about 127 pupils of schools of all types were involved in this type of training. About 450 intermediate school pupils attend defense training camps each year. During the sessions, 150 trainees were awarded CD youth instructor certificates and 320 achieved medical team commander certificates. The attendees of these camps achieved 670 CD proficiency awards and worked 7,000 hours on social projects, accomplishing work worth 90,000 zloty. During the last five-year plan, 57 workshops for defense training were restructured or newly-organized in various types of schools of the voivodship.

We attained considerable achievements in the improvement of the cooperation of CD organs and formations with military units, especially in the organization of joint exercises. An example of this is the demonstration exercises for the commands of units of the National Territorial defense, the Polish Military Organization and the CD leadership personnel of the voivodship that were conducted in 1975 with the use of the territorial defense regiment of the city of Lodz and the CD forces of the Lodz-Polesie district.

A substantive problem in realizing the CD tasks is the selection and employment of persons in positions connected with defense systems. We conducted analyses of the persons employed at these positions in all territorial administrative units, economic units, and in cooperatives. The results became the basis for the employment of individuals possessing professional qualifications that guarantee the proper realization of CD tasks.

We devoted considerable effort toward equipping CD forces and for the care and storage of CD equipment. The quantities received were very useful in raising the readiness of CD formation and the proficiency in its execution of tasks. We also carried out an inventory of the agricultural equipment and engineering machinery of the national economy in enterprises and institutions that are suitable for CD purposes, and we defined the bases for making use of them.

The increasing quantity of CD equipment necessitated the restructuring and expansion of the storage base. At the cost of low financial outlays, thanks to the involvement of CD formations in community work, the majority of the storage buildings were adapted to the needs for maintaining equipment and protecting it from theft and destruction. In addition, this adjustment influenced the proper storage of equipment. Good results in this area were achieved in the districts of Lodz-Widzew, Gorna, and in the city and commune of Strykow, the city of Glownie, and the commune of Brojce. It must be stated, however, that in the voivodship, the plan for the construction of storage facilities was not realized for objective reasons; we shall solve this problem on an over-all scale in the immediate future.

Publicizing CD occupied an important place in our activity. We developed and are developing political propaganda activity to explain to the public the role of the voivodship and the significance of CD under modern conditions, the publicizing of its goals and tasks, and treating such activity as an important element of patriotic-defense education. We are using a variety of methods and operational forms: lectures, talks, rap sessions, meetings with participants of the workers' and revolutionary movement, war veterans, party and government activists, and personnel of the Peoples Polish Army. We are also organizing competition on CD science and annual competitions on wall newspapers. Annually, about 15,000 school youth take part in the competition. The representatives of the voivodship attain first place listings on the central government level in such presentations.

At 20 various exhibits during the past five-year plan, we presented our CD achievements and equipment to the public. About 30,000 persons attended the exhibits. Special emphasis should be given to the competition conducted in 1977 that passed the test for the titles of leading CD inspectorate and territorial CD detachment of the city voivodship of Lodz and the administrative department of the city of Lodz. Such forms of different scope were organized in territorial units of basic level administration, and in labor establishments of the voivodship. Thanks to the introduction of such competitiveness into the activity of these units, we carried out a number of ambitious tasks, adjusted our operating style, and included the active core of the CD formations, and the workers of factories, city residents, and villagers in the realization of our undertakings.

Since the time of establishment of the inspectorates in the new structure, i.e., from mid-1975 to the present, hundreds of thousands of persons have taken part in various publicity and propaganda presentations, and the value of the useful social and defense work of the CD forces of the city voivodship exceeded the amount of 14 million zlotys. Our preparations gained the recognition of the Sejm Commission for National Defense, which visited our voivodship in May, 1978. A delegation of the Territorial Anti-aircraft Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania visited in the voivodship in 1975 for the purpose of exchanging experiences in the field of CD preparations. During the course of the visit, the guests showed great interest in familiarizing themselves with the realization and the solution of the CD undertakings of the voivodship.

Our tasks for the years 1981 through 1985 require continued hard work. Their realization will occur under complex socio-political conditions that our country is undergoing currently. I am convinced that if the people have a complete understanding of the need for CD preparations, we shall realize these tasks in full.

5808

CSO: 2600/262

NEED TO UTILIZE, ENRICH NATIONAL CREATIVITY STRESSED

Bucharest SCINTILIA TIMORUTULUI in Romanian 11 Aug 81 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Prof Dr Ion Manzatu of Bucharest University by Monica Zvirjinski]

[Text] [Question] In every stage of development there are words that occur more frequently, words that seem to belong to that stage and to define it. Now we very often speak of the new and its introduction in all sectors. Why do you think it is the new that is the word of the present?

[Answer] It is by no means a fad. To innovate and introduce the new are just as necessary today for the nations that are developing and have to reach higher levels of competence and ability to act as they are for the economically developed ones whose existence is constantly threatened not only by competition from other nations but also by their own internal tensions.

[Question] Let us talk about our need for the new.

[Answer] We have inherited from the past centuries a great many things that constitute national-historical treasures, but we have also inherited a number of realities resulting from the profound economic backwardness in which the Romanian lands were left and from the attempts of external and even internal elements to block our intellectual progress in keeping with the Romanian people's extraordinary creative potential. It is not very long ago that the politicians of the former regimes were disseminating the idea that the Romanian people have an endemic need to be led by others and are destined only to bow down before a foreign civilization. A historical transition taking more than three decades was needed so that we can say what we say today, and the road from impotence to power was not an easy one. In characterizing this year of 1981 which follows a five-year plan based upon the idea of the technical-scientific revolution, we can say that we would have had no choice but to remain subservient to skills employed by those who developed historically under easier conditions, to go on burdening our balance of foreign payments, and to never be truly competitive. But the 12th Party Congress occasioned the entire people's unanimous decision (despite the voices from abroad that still disputed our right to true freedom) to radically change the structure of the national economy as well as the quality of productive activities, and especially to take no step until we had thought several times about its future consequences.

[Question] Who are the elements who are still causing disagreements about introducing the new, now that we have a scientific view and strategy of the future and an economy open to all innovations?

[Answer] You see we developed for years on end by resorting to imported licenses and equipment, all of which were originally a starting point. But in some fields we made the mistake of neglecting our own inventive potential for many years, repeating the same or other more expensive imports in cycles, instead of developing whatever meant progress at a given point. Even today there are still responsible elements here and there who, out of laziness or ignorance, still maintain that our creative potential is nil compared to what foreign countries have to offer us. What is more, the OSIM [State Office for Inventions and Trademarks] has recently recorded over 76,000 Romanian patents of which the percentage of use, both domestic and foreign, is entirely unsatisfactory. It is incredible that the technical progress plans for some research and design or production units are drafted without consulting the national patent library and without comparison with the latest worldwide procedures, while some subjects have been preferred for 10-15 years. In such cases it is obvious that the three links in the chain of innovation (research, technological development, and assimilation of the manufacturing process) are still singing different tunes! Moreover there is an appalling indifference, here in the five-year plan of quality and efficiency, to the formation of data and information banks in every industrial central and research and technological engineering institute, or at least on the county level, concerning the innovations in national and international production, the state of the technologies used, and the reserves of existing procedures, which have been thoroughly tested but are still unused. In this way we compel the researchers, the specialists engaged in design and production of the new, and the supervisors to waste valuable time and run the risk of adopting outmoded procedures that may have serious consequences for the development of a field. We all know what the information explosion means. Every year 200,000 titles of technical-scientific publications appear in the world, over 60,000 inventions are patented, and thousands and thousands of new technologies and products are launched. Any country that intends to reach a high level of development including Romania, and especially Romania, which is not very rich in primary resources for development, has a first obligation to use the product of human intelligence in the form of new scientific discoveries, technologies and products.

[Question] When asked about the inadequate sources of documentation and information, the elements in charge of organizing them blame it on conservation of funds.

[Answer] I would resort to a comparison. The same economists who explain that they are conserving our funds did not hesitate a few years ago to recommend importing a license that would have amounted to 1,300 times more than double the value of all the informative publications that Romania needed at the time! But what is worse, even today many colleagues in the design and production sectors not only prefer imported technologies (thereby reducing the risk of their responsibility) but also favor equipment and installations that are already obsolete when they are purchased, even when they could use the available funds to purchase patents for innovations whose lifetimes are much longer than those of the products and cost much less.

[Question] I think education, the mold in which the future specialists are formed, has a large part to play in changing that attitude.

[Answer] Certainly in a world of technological and scientific competition (which promises to be keener in the future) it is the duty of education to teach youth to

love the new as a necessity for the development of their nation. The quality and value of all social and economic activity directly depend upon schools and their quality. Whatever equipment and technologies we may have, we will inevitably lag behind others without people who are highly competent, from design to the most elementary installation operations. A great thinker and inventor said that a nation that promotes its values from school on can never be subjugated by other nations for the simple reason that high-quality human minds can never be overcome. They always find the way out of difficult situations. If our youths sometimes become indifferent it is because in their courses we succeed only in repeating threadbare ideas and do not impart to them the thrill of the new or the enthusiasm and sense of responsibility for conceiving it. I am convinced that many of the present failings of the schools would disappear if the teachers themselves were all devoted to the idea of creation and effort. Noble ideas are compromised by the teachers' lack of enthusiasm and conscientiousness. Let us consider, for example, the state of integration of education with research and production. 1. Often the students, to say nothing of pupils, come into a shop or laboratories without the elementary preparation for the activity they should be performing and become a burden upon those who must teach them the basics instead of integrating them in the planned activity. 2. With laudable exceptions, many school and student laboratories are behind in production and research facilities, which means that the youth spends twice as much time by mastering an old technique at first and a new one later. 3. Very few youths learn from their teachers what an invention or a data bank is, or what an extraordinary part is played by timely information in forming creative thought. Of course in improving this situation education has the role of the conductor who knows the score well, but not one of the economic sectors is exempt from the responsibility because you cannot have a nation capable of peak creation if the generations are not aided and do not carry on their efforts. To be sure all this requires great efforts, understanding and courage, but we have no choice. From the high rostrum of the Second Congress of Workers Councils the party secretary general pointed out to us once again that there is no other chance of raising the national economy than by full use of our people's entire creative power. Actually, this is verified by history. The reason for all nations' rapid development and great material and cultural benefits is none other than the treasury of national creativity. It is the duty of all of us, young and less young, producers, teachers and researchers, to give the full measure of our competence to promote and assert it.

5186

CSO: 2700/374

WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Aug 81 p 5

[Article by Johann Georg Reissmueller: "Resistance in Kosovo--How the Yugoslav Leadership Is Trying To Cope With The Unrest"]

[Text] The unrest of the Albanians in Yugoslavia's Kosovo differs in several respects from other ethnic conflicts Yugoslavia has experienced. There are several reasons for the peculiarity of the case. The Albanians constitute the only important non-Slav group in Yugoslavia (the Hungarians living in the Vojvodina, numerically much weaker, apparently being in the process of being absorbed as an ethnic entity by the Serbs). They are predominantly Muslims, and the maternal state of their ethnic group--Albania, headed by Enver Hoxha--feels it is entitled and able to increase the national consciousness and self-confidence of the "brothers across the border." However, the methods with which the Yugoslav leadership is trying to settle the matter differ little from those it used to master national movements elsewhere in years past. There is a pattern according to which recalcitrant peoples in Yugoslavia time and again are relegated to the position desired and considered normal by the central authorities, and Belgrade is now also sticking to that pattern in the Kosovo.

It made a familiar impression when the leadership at first employed Serbian police to cope with students demonstrating and rioting in Pristina, the capital of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, which is part of the Serbian Republic. This had been its attitude whenever there was ferment in the Kosovo in the past. The Serbian police, however, are known for going into action without much restraint. They do not make much fuss with their compatriots in Serbia proper, much less with Albanians in the Kosovo in the case of major riots there. This has to do with the fact that the conflict in the Kosovo basically amounts to resistance by the Albanians against the Serbs. In such a situation the employment of Serbian police was bound to lend fuel to the fire. Prudent persons in Belgrade apparently realized this quickly, and soon police composed of all Yugoslav ethnic entities were sent to the Kosovo. That probably contributed to limiting the fire.

As always, this time too the Yugoslav Army blocked off the center of the disturbances together with the police. This has now gone so far as to cut off the Province of Kosovo completely from the rest of Yugoslavia, and of course also from Albania. For weeks on end neither foreigners nor citizens were allowed to enter the Kosovo without special permission. The army also played an important role in suppressing the Croatian national movement in 1971. At that time it encircled Zagreb and cut it off

from the Croatian country around it until police in the capital of the republic "cleaned up." This demonstrates again that the Yugoslav Armed Forces have a domestic mission as important as that of defending the country against any external attack.

After the revolt in Pristina the top party and government officials of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo to the extent that they are Albanian have been removed one after the other. In part they are being forcibly retired, in part they are being transferred to subordinate positions. In any case, they are disappearing from the sight of the population. Strange as it may seem, the Byzantine taboo against them is continuing as a result: as long as they were on top, no one was allowed to say as much as a word of criticism about them, but not that they have fallen the people are supposed to regard them as nonpersons. They have been replaced in part by officials who represented the Kosovo in the 1960's, be it in Pristina or in the central party and government bodies in Belgrade. At that time those men were not regarded highly by the Albanians in the Kosovo. People said about them that they were lending little support to the Albanian ethnic group but were more concerned with Belgrade interests--centralist Yugoslav ones and those of the Serbian Republic, of which Belgrade is also the capital.

That was perhaps not quite correct. In Yugoslavia the making of policy at the top is protected from public scrutiny to such an extent that the man-in-the-street often adopts mistaken judgments that have spread among the public about what a leading man, wants, does or tries to alleviate. Perhaps the Kosovo representatives of the 1960's too, who occupied jobs of little influence or fairly small conspicuousness in the 1970's, have inwardly changed in the meantime. The fact that Belgrade has now recalled some of them to important positions does not yet constitute any proof to the contrary. After all, someone has to occupy the leading positions in Pristina, and since Belgrade at least publicly wants more or less to preserve the ethnic quotas in the hierarchy of the Province of Kosovo, it needs for the majority of these posts members of the Albanian ethnic group, which constitutes more than three-fourths of the population in the Kosovo.

But whatever the new officials in Pristina may be like, through the overthrow of the old officials ordered by headquarters in Belgrade the Yugoslav party once again has removed a regional leadership which represented the interest of a people in a multinational state in such a way as to cause that people to award it a certain amount of recognition. It had engaged in similar practice in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia, in the Vojvodina and in Macedonia 10 years before. Since in Yugoslavia no position of power is filled by genuine popular election, no party or government leader can formally claim to be a democratic representative. It does happen, however, that by persistently advocating the interests of a region, of the ethnic entity inhabiting it, the leadership of one of the eight regions--six republics and two autonomous provinces--gains the respect of that ethnic entity and is accepted as its representative. (This may, however, be uncertain since there is no systematic way of establishing it reliably.)

This was surely the case in Slovenia and Croatia, in Serbia and Macedonia around 1970, and again in Serbia in the mid-1970's. At first glance it appears strange that the Yugoslav party this time and again deprives itself of what every communist party misses sorely--popular assent. As a Leninist party, the Yugoslav communists are, however, constantly afraid of becoming dependent on the people,

for Leninism means rule of the top of a cadre party over the people. What is more, in multinational Yugoslavia the leadership is worried lest regional leaderships supported "populistically" by their respective ethnic entity and the republics get involved in ever new conflicts among themselves. There are conflicts between the components of the Yugoslav Federation as it is, but as long as the populations are not involved these can, if need be, be allayed more easily or at least dampened by a decisive word from the center.

The fact that the penal organs are working at a high pitch in the Kosovo is also reminiscent of old times. This time there actually are criminal offenses to be prosecuted, because the demonstrations in Pristina led to violence. This was by no means so in Croatia, say 10 years ago; those sentenced at that time had all been charged with uttering politically objectionable statements. Now, in the Kosovo, though some of the prison sentences seem also to have been meted out for purely verbal offenses (for example, "counterrevolutionary activity"), the sentences are only part of the official reaction. After the unrest in Pristina, the university there was closed until further notice (something like that had happened previously only during the student unrest in Belgrade in the summer of 1968), and all public sports events were banned in the entire Kosovo for a lengthy period--also something the authorities had previously not resorted to in the wake of unrest.

What makes the Kosovo affair so explosive is an aspect which is also peculiar to it--comparable only to former unrest, likewise among the Albanian ethnic group in Yugoslavia. The Croatian reform movement had been accused by headquarters of separatism, of striving to create an independent Croatian state. Political movements in Slovenia, Macedonia and Serbia had been accused by the central party leadership in the past only of being deviationist, with never any mention of separatism. The Albanians now are the only ethnic group in Yugoslavia being suspected by the central power of wanting to join a foreign state--Albania. It is for this reason that the demand that could be heard in the Kosovo now during the demonstrations, and also thereafter, that Belgrade should accord the autonomous province the status of a republic was condemned so utterly and dismissed as out of the question. A Kosovo elevated to the status of a republic--in other words, one entirely separated from the Republic of Serbia--the Serbian and also the central leadership in Belgrade fear, would be the penultimate step prior to joining neighboring Albania.

And this fear extends even further. It is feared that Kosovo might not be alone in joining Albania but take along with it western Macedonia (with the towns of Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar) mostly inhabited by Albanians, and perhaps even in addition the southern part of Montenegro, where many Albanians reside--for instance, in Stari Bar. In the 1970's it was possible to quietly discuss with Yugoslav party people the question as to whether it might not be best to accord the status of a republic to Kosovo and its Albanians, as to whether the increasingly expanded autonomy of the Province of Kosovo might not raise its independence vis-a-vis Serbia in a natural way and ineluctably to a point where one day elevation to the status of a republic would become a mere formality. For a long time these will now be questions not worth raising in Yugoslavia.

Nor is there now any public dialogue in Yugoslavia about the historical-political background of the unrest among the Albanians in the Kosovo. Thus the leadership is continuing another tradition of communist Yugoslavism, namely: National unrest must

never appear understandable even to a small extent against the background of past events; it has a history only insofar as it may reveal relics of "fascism." Thus the party disqualified the Croatian national movement around 1970. Thus, around the same time, it is definitively judged impulses in Slovenia of a will of its own which met with Belgrade's disapproval. And thus it has classified so far all unrest among the Albanians in the Kosovo and in Macedonia.

It does not want to utter a word about the fact that first in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and then also in communist Yugoslavia Albanians for decades were treated as a citizens of secondary rank and rights. Rankovic, chief of the secret police and vice president, of Serb nationality, had considered it his special task to hold down the Albanians in a brutal manner. When he toppled in 1966 a better time for the Albanians began in Yugoslavia. Not only did the oppression gradually cease, but the Kosovo party and government apparatus soon predominantly was put in Albanian hands. Cultural institutions increased--the university in Pristina, publishing, Pristina radio with its Albanian radio and television programs. The Yugoslav Federation gave the Kosovo regular allocations from the government budget, and the Kosovo now received increasingly large amounts from the federal fund for underdeveloped regions paid into with a lot of complaining by the more developed republics.

The Albanians in the Kosovo gained strong self-confidence, which extended to the Albanians in Macedonia. Their high birth rate--the highest in Europe--quickly raised the proportion of Albanians among the Kosovo population (soon to be 80 percent), with that of the Serbs declining at the same rate. Tens of thousands of people belonging to the Serbian minority in the Kosovo feel hemmed in as a result of the advance of the Albanians, who are sticking together and whose Illyrian language and Muslim religion are strange to them anyway--hemmed in on their ancient native soil, because the Kosovo was a core of the medieval Serbian Kingdom. Since the late 1960's Serbs have migrated from the Kosovo into Serbia proper--The Republic of Serbia less the Autonomous Province of Kosovo--because they no longer saw a future for themselves in the Kosovo and even did not feel safe there any longer. That subject, however has been taboo in Yugoslavia for more than a decade.

Despite their upswing, however, the Albanians have not forgotten the previous bad times. Peoples have a long memory--but that is not something the Yugoslav party wants to know about this time either.

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RELIGIOUS CLERICALISM SAID TO SPREAD ETHNIC HATRED

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Aug 81 p 6

[Text] Certain individual priests extol their faith on a reactionary national-fascist platform, thus spreading hatred toward the faithful of other religious persuasions and toward other peoples.

In the struggle for strengthening the course of our Yugoslav revolution, and for the development of self-management, we must resolutely oppose various types of nationalism. We must devote particular attention to the activities of the clericalist nationalists, since certain priests are carrying on forbidden political activity, which they are cloaking in religious garb. They extol their faith on a reactionary national-fascist platform, thus spreading hatred toward the faithful of other religious persuasions and toward other peoples, supporting the intolerance of religious communities toward the political system of socialist self-management, trying to rehabilitate known war criminals, and dreaming of a time when "the clergy could assume worldly power." In this, they misuse the religious feelings of the working people and citizens. Recently, they have attempted to reestablish and revitalize old reactionary organizations such as the brotherhoods of Christian congregations, the Catholic youth organizations, young Moslem organizations and others.

Particular zeal in these activities has been shown by certain Orthodox priests in Semberija and Majevisa. At the command of high officials of the Tuzla see and with the help of individual nationalist fanatics, they have been manipulating uninformed citizens. They are reviving prewar bigoted organizations, such as priestly brotherhoods, whose purpose is to repress priestly associations working within the framework of the Socialist Alliance. They have been establishing brotherhoods of Christian congregations whose purpose is to gather believers on the basis of the experience and the platform of prewar bigoted organizations with nationalist or Nazi ideologies. They are known to be the moving force for the creation of organizations with the same names as those which were the most eminent supporters of the Ljotic ideology and ardent servants of German fascism before World War II.

Provocations

Similarly they attempt to create a Catholic youth organization and operate such a magazine as OGNJISTE (THE HEARTH), which with ingenious craft, even pretense

of wit, spreads their clericalism-nationalism and intolerance toward all atheist positions. Some Imams from the ranks of the Moslem community at Bjelina are striving to keep up in the urge to spread national intolerance.

These manifestations vividly recall the wartime period, when Ljotic, Nedic and Draza Mihailovic competed with each other in spreading the Chetnik ideology and provocations of the Serbs against Moslems. At that time, they manipulated the fact that the Croatian Ustasa regime was conducting terror and genocide campaigns against the Serbian and Jewish population, so that with the acquiescence of the German overlords they agreed to the annexation of eastern Bosnia to the Nedic and Ljotic regime. The Ljotic national-fascist ideology was also attentively nurtured in the brotherhoods of Christian congregations by Ljotic ideologists.

The activities of Moslem clericalist-nationalists today also bring to mind that these promoters of reactionary fascist ideology, stemming from the top of the Islamic religious community, tried to divert the Moslem population from participation in the War of National Liberation. At the time of the occupation, wrapping their activities in religious garb, they launched the idea of Bosnian-Herzegovinian autonomy under the protection of fascist Germany. They became involved in the establishment of the 13th SS division with the aim of accommodating Hitler; this military formation was eventually to serve them as a bond with the West in case external factors contributed to political breakdown in Yugoslavia, as they hoped.

Freedom

This pro-fascist clericalist-nationalist ideology in Orthodox and Moslem congregations was defeated in the War of National Liberation, as was the Ustasa ideology. It was defeated because Moslems, Serbs and Croats in eastern Bosnia, as well as in the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, refused to be manipulated by the fascist occupying force. They took a position in support of the front of national liberation, under the leadership of the Communist Party, for brotherhood, unity, accord and community, as the only way to assure their emergence from darkness and the opening of prospects for harmonious life together in their mutual homeland.

Why are we making these comparisons? We do so to evoke unpleasant memories from our history. We are doing it because we do not want anyone to live in illusion and to expect that the working class--the working people, citizens, young people, believers and patriots of today--40 years after the struggle and the victory, and with all the efforts to build a socialist self-management society, will quietly watch the resurrection of that clericalist-fascist ideology and the attempts at sowing hatred between peoples. We paid too dearly for freedom, brotherhood and unity to permit someone to manipulate the religious feelings of the citizenry and national distinctions in order to destroy the most valued achievements of the War of National Liberation, the socialist revolution and the socialist self-management society.

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